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INTRODUCTION
For nearly halfa century, the U.S. government has maintained strict
controls on exports of cryptographic products and technology.' With
the coming of the "information age"-and the accompanying
explosive need for and development of information security prod-
ucts-these controls have become increasingly visible and conten-
tious.2 Where only a handful of products and companies were
affected by these controlsjust ten years ago, today virtually every high-
technology company and multinational business is caught, to some
degree, by encryption export controls.
U.S. controls on exports of cryptographic products and technology
are highly complex, restrictive, and controversial. American exporters
routinely complain that encryption export controls place them at a
severe competitive disadvantage, citing as evidence a burdensome
licensing process and the loss of business to foreign competitors that
purportedly are subject to less stringent export regulation. At the
other end of the spectrum, the law enforcement and national security
communities insist that strict export controls are an essential tool in
the battle against the growing threat of international crime and
terrorism.
Thus, the encryption export control debate is being driven by
complex and seemingly irreconcilable policy objectives, including
privacy and First Amendment concerns, commercial efforts to protect
proprietary business information, and, of course, law enforcement and
national security concerns. The purpose of this Essay is neither to
criticize nor to endorse U.S. controls on encryption exports. Rather,
this Essay attempts to add to the legal and policy debate by offering
practical insights on the export control framework and the policy
tensions underlying the controls.
1. See infra notes 8-40 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. cryptographic export
regulations); see also Kenneth J. Pierce, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the First
Amendment: A Need for Legislation, 17 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 197, 201-02 (stating that National
Security Agency ("NSA") was established in 1952 largely to control cryptologic services). In
1975, the NSA attempted to stop all federal grants for cryptology research. See id. at 203. The
NSA now controls all grants to cryptology research. See id. at 204.
2. See generally Lance J. Hoffman et al., Cryptography Policy, 37 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
ACM 109 (1994); Jill M. Ryan, Note, Freedom to Speak Unintelligibly: The First Amendment
Implications of Government-Controlled Encryption, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1165, 1167 (1996)
(stating that encryption software is essential to protect mass amounts of personal, financial, and
business related data transmitted through insecure channels); Peter H. Lewis, Between a Hacker
and a Hard Place: Data-Security Export Law Puts Businesses in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at
D1.
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Part I identifies the growing commercial needs for strong encryp-
tion in the ever-shrinking global marketplace. Part II discusses the
scope, structure, and effect of current U.S. encryption export controls
and licensing requirements. Part III surveys a number of initia-
tives-legal, political, and commercial-intended to liberalize
encryption export controls. Finally, Part IV considers the competing
policy concerns that will continue to shape litigation and the debate
about the future course of encryption export controls.
I. INFORMATION SECURITY NEEDS AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURES ON
U.S. INDUSTRY
It is axiomatic that secure electronic communication is essential to
compete in today's international marketplace. As U.S. companies
continue to expand their business operations around the world, they
often need to exchange sensitive information with foreign branches,
joint venture partners, subsidiaries, subcontractors, product suppliers,
and customers. They must be able to communicate securely about
those activities, often on a real-time basis. These business realities
require more extensive and increasingly sophisticated electronic
communication-by fax, telephone, videophone, computer network,
etc. For this mode of business operation to remain viable, however,
companies must be confident that the communications will remain
secure and confidential.
Today's level of information security is, if anything, the tip of the
proverbial iceberg. Until recently, most companies used relatively
rudimentary cryptography for a limited number of purposes.3 That
is no longer satisfactory. U.S. and foreign companies now are in the
process of moving to a much broader use of more powerful cryptogra-
phy-either as a result of customer demand, for their own commer-
cial protection, or both.' These companies include software develop-
3. At its most fundamental level, encryption is the scrambling of information-whether
in the form of data, text, or video signals. In general, encryption is accomplished with a "key."
Although not necessarily true, for our purposes, it is sufficient to assume that the "security" of
an encryption algorithm depends essentially on its key length. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED
CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE IN C, at xix (2d ed. 1996)
(providing introduction to encryption and describing various uses for information security); RSA
Laboratories, FAQ 3.0 (visited Jan. 29, 1997) <http://wwv.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/faq_toc.htnl>
(on file with The American University Law Review).
4. See Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin, National Cryptography Policy for the Information Age,
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 1996, at 33; A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 718 (1995) (noting that
with new advances in communications technology, many businesses are concerned about data
security).
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ers producing security products that use encryption;5 businesses and
financial institutions that increasingly need to offer strong encryption
capabilities in their software;6 and telecommunications equipment
and service providers that seek to encrypt transmissions or to offer
encryption capabilities to their customers. 7
II. U.S. EXPORT LICENSING REQUIREMENTS8
Over the years, we have observed a number of misconceptions
about the scope and reach of encryption export controls. All of the
following statements are at least partially inaccurate:
* No products with encryption capabilities may be exported.
* Products with encryption routines with 40-bit keys or less are
not subject to licensing requirements.
* Products with encryption routines exceeding 40-bit key-lengths
are not exportable under any circumstances.
* Products using the DES algorithm cannot be exported.
* Other countries do not control exports of encryption.
5. See SCHNEIER, supra note 3, at 561-94 (outlining real-world applications of secured
information and explaining encryption hardware and software).
6. See, e.g., id. at 584-85 (describing security-oriented software program that secures
electronic mail).
7. See id. at 594-95. One example of a telecommunications company offering encryption-
capable hardware to its customers is AT&T and its Telephone Security Device ("TSD") Clipper
Phone. See id. To prevent interception of a communication by a third party, the TSD generates
a unique signal that only the TSD at the other end of the line can decipher. See id.
8. As this Essay was going to print in December 1996, the regulations governing exports
of cryptographic products and technology were undergoing substantial revision. On December
13, 1996, the Clinton Administration implemented part of its "key recovery" proposal in the
form of an interim final rule issued by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export
Administration. See 61 Fed. Reg. 65,462 (1996). In a separate but related development,
Commerce Department officials announced their intention to publish a rule by the end of
December that would transfer regulatoryjurisdiction over commercial encryption exports from
the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls to the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Export Administration. See id.
Assuming that such a jurisdictional transfer occurs, commercial encryption exports will be
governed by the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations rather than by the
State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulations. As a result, the references in the
discussion below to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations will become obsolete.
Nonetheless, we expect that the Commerce Department will adopt virtually all of the rules and
interpretations discussed below. In other words, although the governing regulations and
agencies will change, the basic export licensing requirements and policies are expected to
remain essentially the same.
That being said, there will be a few significant differences under the new regulatory regime.
Mirst, the new regulations will allow encryption products that meet "key recovery" criteria (as
determined by the Commerce Department) to be exported without an export license, regardless
of algorithm or key length. Second, companies that persuade the Commerce Department that
they are moving toward the development of such "key recovery" products will be eligible-at
least temporarily-for liberal export licensing treatment with respect to other encryption
products with a key length of up to 56-bits. Third, although the NSA will continue to play a
major role in shaping encryption export policy, the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation will, for the first time, participate in export licensing decisions.
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0 An individual license is required for every export.
To dispel these misconceptions, the following discussion explains how
U.S. export controls actually work, both in terms of what types of
products are controlled and of the nature of the export licensing
process.
A. Scope of Export Controls
U.S. controls on exports of "information security" are exceedingly
broad. The term "information security" is defined to include any
technique that leaves data or text in a form that is not readable.9
Controls apply to exports of hardware, software, and related technolo-
gy. 0 Although the controls do not apply to general scientific or
engineering principles commonly taught in schools or to information
in the public domain," they do apply to virtually all information and
products that are treated as proprietary.
2
The controls apply to all "exports" from the United States to any
foreign country. 3 This includes the situation in which an engineer
instinctively stashes some floppy disks in his or her coat pocket and
departs the United States without realizing he or she has just
exported the software, in possible violation of U.S. law. 4 The term
"export" also includes transfers of technology to any "foreign
national" in the United States. 5 The term "foreign national"
includes any person who is neither a citizen nor a permanent resident
alien (i.e., green card holder) of the United States, even if the person
holds an H-1 visa or the equivalent. In addition, the controls apply
9. SeeExportAdministration Regulations ("EAR"), 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714, 12,930 (1996) (to
be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 772) (defining "information security" as "[a]ll the means and
functions ensuring the accessibility, confidentiality or integrity of information or communica-
tions").
10. See generally International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-130
(1996) (regulating export and import of certain defense-related articles and services). For an
outline of U.S. rules that govern the exportation of cryptographic products, see SCHNEIER, supra
note 3, at 610-17.
11. See22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5).
12. See EAR, 61 Fed. Reg. at 12,747 (to be codified at 15 G.FR. § 734.3(b) (3) (i))
(exempting from EAR control "publicly available" technology and software that are published
or will be published); id at 12,749 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 734.7(b)) ("Software and
information is published when it is available for general distribution either for free or at a price
that does not exceed the cost of reproduction and distribution.").
13. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a) (defining "export" as "sending or taking a defense article out
of the United States in any manner"); 15 G.F.R. Pt. 772 (defining "export" as "an actual
shipment or transmission of items out of the United States").
14. See SCHNEIER, supra note 3, at 610 (warning of grave consequences of exporting
protected information without proper license). Butsee22 C.F.R. § 123.27 (permitting temporary
export of cryptographic hardware and software by U.S. citizen without export license).
15. See 22 C.F.L § 120.17(a) (4).
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The State Department's International Traffic in Arms Regulations
("ITAR") 17 regulate the export of defense articles, technology, and
services under the statutory authority of the Arms Export Control
Act. 8 Items are controlled by the ITAR if they are described in the
U.S. Munitions List, which is contained in the ITAR. 19 These
regulations, which are administered and enforced by the State
Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls, 0 impose an export
licensing requirement for the export of every item that is listed on the
Munitions List.21
Separately, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export
Administration regulates the export of so-called "dual-use" commodi-
ties and technical data through a complex set of rules set forth in the
Export Administration Regulations ("EAR").22 The term "dual-use"
refers to items that have both a civilian and a military application.2
In general terms, the export control jurisdiction of the EAR extends
to all products that are not designated on the Munitions List and that
therefore are not subject to ITAR control.24
Until recently, products with cryptographic features or capabilities
have been subject to the exclusive export control jurisdiction of the
ITAR. Today, most types of encryption software, technical data, and
hardware still are controlled by the ITAR under Category XIII of the
Munitions List.25  Through the implementation of regulatory
exceptions, however, the State Department has waived its jurisdiction
over certain categories of those items and now permits the Commerce
Department to regulate those excepted products.
26
16. See i. § 120.16.
17. Id pts. 120-130.
18. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994).
19. See 22 C.F.R. pt. 121.
20. See id. § 120.1 (a).
21. See id. § 123.1 (imposing licensing requirement for export of defense articles).
22. 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714-13,041 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-774).
23. See id. at 12,735 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 730.3); see also 15 C.F.R. pt. 774
(providing Commerce Control List ("CCL") of commodities covered by EAR).
24. See61 Fed. Reg. 12,714, 12,747 (to be codified at 15 C.FR. § 734.3(b)(1)(i)) (noting
that exports included on U.S. Munitions List are not controlled by Bureau of Export Administra-
tion); see also 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (listing defense articles, services, and related technical data
controlled by ITAR).
25. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b).
26. See it. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b) (1) (i)-(ix) (excepting enumerated "cryptographic equipment
and software" from ITAR).
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The National Security Agency ("NSA") historically has played the
lead role in shaping encryption export control policy. Charged with
deciphering and monitoring international communications, the NSA
has the largest stake and the greatest technical expertise of any U.S.
government office in the area of cryptography." Accordingly, the
State Department relies almost entirely on the NSA to determine what
products are subject to a licensing requirement and the licensing
policy for such items.28 To fulfill its mission, of course, the NSA
needs to be able to decrypt or "crack" encoded messages. Because
there are no restrictions on the sale and use of encryption domestical-
ly, controls on exports represent the only effective way for the NSA to
limit the level of encryption technology that is deployed overseas.
The inherent limitation of this approach is that it does not reach
encryption products and technology that are developed overseas and
therefore not subject to U.S. export controls.
C. ITAR Controls on Cryptographic Products
As noted above, exports of products with the capacity to encrypt or
decrypt information generally are governed by the ITAR1° Specifi-
cally, Category XIII of the U.S. Munitions List, set forth in Part 121
of these regulations, covers "Information Security Systems and equip-
ment, cryptographic devices, software, and components specifically
designed or modified therefor, including: (1) Cryptographic ...
software with the capability of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality
of information or information systems.""0 If a particular product
falls within this description, it is-subject to the exceptions discussed
below--deemed a "defense article" and therefore falls within the
ITAR export licensing regime.31 In that event, the product will
require prior export approval from the State Department's Office of
Defense Trade Controls.32
27. Although the NSA's primary interest is in its ability to monitor global communications,
especially those of foreign militaries and potential terrorists, it also recognizes the United States'
interest in preserving the global activities and leadership of its companies and financial
institutions.
28. In some cases, the State Department will override an NSA recommendation for licensing
approval, particularly if it has foreign policy concerns about the country of destination or
problems with the end-user of the proposed export. These issues often arise in the context of
proposed exports to China.
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b)(1).
31. See id. § 120.1(a) (stating that purpose of ITAR is "to control the export and import of
defense articles and defense services"); see also id. § 120.6 (defining "defense article" for purposes
of ITAR).
32. Seeid. § 123.1(a).
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The general rule of State Department jurisdiction, however, is
subject to certain exceptions. Of the total of nine exceptions
currently set forth in the ITAR,"3 five are used most commonly.
First, the Banking or Money Transactions Exception applies to products
that are
[s]pecifically designed, developed or modified for use in machines
for banking or money transactions, and restricted to use only in
such transactions. Machines for banking or money transactions
include automatic teller machines, self-service statement printers,
point of sale terminals or equipment for the encryption of
interbanking transactions.
3 4
Second, the Access Control Exception encompasses products with
information security
[1] imited to access control, such as automatic teller machines, self-
service statement printers or point of sale terminals, which protects
password or personal identification numbers (PIN) or similar data
to prevent unauthorized access to facilities but does not allow
encryption of files or text, except as directly related to the password
of [sic] PIN protection.35
Third, the Data Authentication Exception covers encryption products that
are
[1]imited to data authentication which calculates a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) or similar result to ensure no
alteration of text has taken place, or to authenticate users, but does
not allow for encryption of data, text or other media other than
that needed for the authentication.
36
Fourth, the Data Compression Exception applies to information security
products that are "[r]estricted to fixed data compression or coding
techniques."' 7 Fifth, the Restricted Broadcast Exception covers products
"[1] imited to receiving for radio broadcast, pay television or similar
restricted audience television of the consumer type, without digital
encryption and where digital decryption is limited to the video, audio
or management functions."' Any product that falls within one or
more of these exceptions is subject to the export control jurisdiction
of the Commerce Department rather than of the State Depart-
ment.39
33. See id. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b) (1) (i)-(ix).
34. Id. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b)(1)(ii).
35. Id. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b) (1) (v).
36. Id. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b)(1) (vi).
37. Id. § 121.1 cat. XIII(b)(1).
38. Id.
39. See 61 Fed. Reg. 12,714, 13,004 (1996) (to be codified at 15 C.FR. pt. 774, cat. 5(H1))
(listing information security equipment and software controlled by EAR).
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The regulatory exceptions to Category XIII make no reference to
the relative sophistication or complexity of the encryption routine.
Because they are "algorithm-neutral," the availability of the exceptions
hinges on the purpose and function of the encryption rather than on
the specific algorithm being used. Nevertheless, the NSA and the
Department of Commerce typically will inquire about the level of
encryption used in a particular product; incorporating an unusually
high level of encryption for a relatively simple function could suggest
that the encryption in fact is intended for other, unauthorized uses
beyond the scope of the exceptions.
In addition, the regulatory exceptions do not apply a "foreign
availability" test. That is, the regulations provide no exception for
cryptographic software readily available overseas or on the Internet.
Thus, if a cryptographic product fails to satisfy one of the exceptions,
the export licensing requirement applies regardless of whether the
product is widely and easily available outside the United States.
D. EAR Controls
Under the EAR, most types of software with a cryptographic
function that are exempt from ITAR control fall under Export
Control Classification Number ("ECCN") 5D002(c) of the Commerce
Control List ("CCL").40 In the case of software controlled under
ECCN 5D002 (c), an individual export license is not required if the
software qualifies under the relevant Advisory Notes.4
III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO ENCRYPTION EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. controls on encryption exports have been under increasing
attack in recent years. U.S. exporters-from software developers to
financial institutions to computer and telecommunications compa-
nies-routinely criticize encryption export controls for being too
restrictive and cumbersome, as well as for being ineffective given the
growing availability of competing products overseas.42 Principally in
response to this groundswell of industry opposition, Congress and-to
a far lesser degree-the Clinton Administration have proposed a
number of reforms to the export control framework.
40. See id. at 13,005 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 774, supp. 1) (listing information
security software as item on Commerce Control List ("CCL")).
41. See id. (excepting from EAR export licensing requirement cryptographic software
needed for use of certain equipment, such as automated teller machines, data authentication
devices, and machines used for banking or money transactions).
42. See Stephan Barlas, Key Decisions Likely on Encryption Exports, IEEE SOF'VARE, Nov. 1996,
at 102; New Administration Encyption Paper Sparks Industry Crit iein, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 24,
1996, at 1, 26-27 [hereinafter Encryption Paper].
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A. Key Management Proposals
The Clinton Administration's key management initiatives have
evolved considerably since the "clipper chip" was proposed in April
1993.41 The history and details of these proposals are chronicled in
the various Internet cites of organizations that have been following
this issue.'
In early October 1996, the Administration announced a new "key
management" or "key recovery" initiative.45 As currently proposed,
this initiative will provide favorable export licensing treatment to
companies that submit plans to develop key recovery products within
a two-year period beginning on January 1, 1997.46 During that two-
year period, companies that obtain "general license" approvals from
the Commerce Department will be authorized to export non-key
recovery products with up to 56-bit key lengths.47 Although the
government has not yet issued criteria for key recovery products, their
critical features will allow a government agency, in appropriate
circumstances, to obtain the key to a particular identified communica-
tion.48
In addition, the Administration has announced that it will shift
export licensing jurisdiction for encryption products from the State
Department to the Commerce Department.49 This shift in licensing
jurisdiction will require both agencies to amend their regulations,
but-standing alone-it will not result in major changes in licensing
43. See SCHNEIER, supra note 3, at 591 ("The Clipper Chip... is an NSA-designed, tamper-
resistant ... chip designed for encrypting voice conversations; it is one of the two chips that
implements the U.S. government's Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES).... The chip
implements ... an NSA-designed classified secret-key encryption algorithm.").
44. See, e.g., Center for Democracy and Technology (last modified Jan. 29, 1997)
<http://www.cdt.org> (on file with The American University Law Review); Electronic Frontier
Foundation, EFFweb (visited Jan. 29, 1997) <http://www.eff.org> (on file with The American
University Law Review); Electronic Privacy Information Center Homepage (last modifiedJan. 25,
1997) <http://www.epic.org> (on file with The American University Law Review).
45. SeeExec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996); Statement of the Vice President
on Encryption (Oct. 1, 1996) (on file with The American University Law Review); Administration
Offers New Plan to Ease Eneryption Export Controls, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 4,1996, at 8 [hereinafter
New Plan].
46. See New Plan, supra note 45, at 8; Statement of the Vice President on Encryption, supra
note 45.
47. Id.
48. The Clinton Administration is seeking to convince foreign governments to adopt a key
management approach on a multilateral basis. Thus far, efforts to develop multilateral rules for
controlling encryption are under consideration within the "Group of Seven" industrialized
countries and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See BIAC/ICC
Joint Discussion Paper on International Cryptography Guidelines (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with
The American University Law Review); G-7, In Its Effort to Contain 7errorism, Appears Ready to Regulate
Encyption, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1268, 1269 (Aug. 7, 1996).
49. See supra note 8.
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policies. The NSA will continue to play a major role in shaping
encryption export licensing policy. Moreover, for the first time, the
Justice Department and the FBI in particular will participate in
individual export licensing decisions in response to requests received
by the Commerce Department. Reflecting the increasing concerns of
the domestic law enforcement community regarding encryption, this
use of export controls to serve a domestic law enforcement interest is
a new and controversial development.
The key management concept has generated strong opposition
from the exporting community."0 On one level, industry is con-
cerned that customers-particularly foreign customers-will reject any
product that offers U.S. government access, regardless of Fourth
Amendment or other protections. Would a French company accept
a software product that could give a U.S. entity access to its keys?
Would a U.S. company accept such a product if French companies,
the French government, or both potentially could access its keys?
On another level, there is a growing consensus that the proposed
56-bit key length would not allow a sufficient level of security in
today's marketplace. A panel of distinguished cryptographers and
computer scientists recently concluded that 56-bit keys are increasingly
inadequate and recommended a minimum key-length of 90-bits for
non-public key systems and a key-length of ten or more times that for
public key systems.5
The Administration's proposal nonetheless may hold some promise
for certain companies and industry sectors. IBM, Apple, Digital
Equipment, Hewlett-Packard, Sun, and others have formed a coalition
to develop a key recovery system that will meet the Administration's
criteria.52 The potential appeal of key recovery is based on the
premise that a company or a financial institution that develops and
controls its own software might even prefer to have a key recovery
ability in its software. That capability would allow it to trace improper
activity if necessary.
Other companies and industry sectors, however, do not benefit
from the Administration's proposal and are "extremely unhappy" with
50. See Encr)ption Paper, supra note 42, at 30; Key Senators Attack New Administration Encryption
Polic, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 18, 1996, at 9.
51. See Matt Blaze et al., Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate
Commercial Security: A Report by an Ad Hoc Group of Cryptographers and Computer Scientists (last
modifiedJan. 1996) <http://www.bsa.org/policy/encryption/cryptographers.html> (on file with
The American University Law Review).
52. See New Plan, supra note 45, at 1; Michael Moeller, IBM Boosts Encryption Initiative, P.C.
WEEK, Sept. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12549915.
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it.53 Moreover, it is not at all clear how key management could be
applied to uses such as the Internet. Would Microsoft, Netscape, and
every other Internet provider wishing to provide a decent level of
security be required to track keys for every Internet message?
Likewise, companies producing voice communication products have
indicated that they have no interest in attempting to develop key
recovery products. 4
B. Foreign Availability and Commerce Department/NSA Study
Even if the Clinton Administration's key management proposal
were otherwise satisfactory, it soon may be too little and too late. The
realities of the international marketplace quickly are catching up with
the government's ability to control cryptographic technology. Foreign
software manufacturers increasingly are developing and offering
reliable, high-level cryptographic products.
InJanuary 1996, the Commerce Department and the NSA released
a joint study on the international market for encryption software.5
Although the report found that the U.S. industry still dominates the
world market for software encryption products, it noted that compet-
ing foreign products do exist and that controls on U.S. exports can
have a negative effect on U.S. competitiveness. 6
Critics of the study charge that it significantly understates the
adverse competitive effects of the controls. In particular, these critics
assert that the study does not adequately address the "first-mover" effect. 7
53. See New Plan, supra note 45, at 1.
54. See id. at 22-23.
55. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE & NATIONAL SECURrIY AGENCY, A STUDY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE wrrH ENCRYPTION (hereinafter aommerce/NSA
Study] (on file with The American University Law Review); see also Neal Weinberg, Industry Groups
Seek to Secure "Cyberproperty". COMPUTER WORLD, Jan. 22, 1996, at 12 (noting that Clinton
Administration has proposed that government would retain spare set of "code-breaking keys" in
exchange for permitting further use of cryptographic software); Dinah Zeiger, Brown to Urge
Easing Export Controls on Encryption Software, DENY. POST, Jan. 13, 1996, at El (reporting that
Commerce Department's position on cryptography indicates that Clinton Administration intends
to loosen controls on cryptographic software).
56. See Commerce/NSA Study, supra note 55, at 111-7, 8; see also Zeiger, supra note 55, at El
(noting that past controls have stifled market for encryption software).
57. The "first-mover" effect, sometimes referred to as a "headstart" or "pioneer" effect,
describes the advantage that can be obtained by a company that is the first to the market with
a new or better product. See generaly RALPH E. BIGGADIKE, CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION: ENTRY,
STRATEGY, AND PERFORMANCE (1979); William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages from
Pioneering New Markets: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1, 15 (1994); F. M.
Scherer, First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: Comment, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 173
(1994); Richard Schmalensee, Product hifferentiation: Advantages in Pioneering Brands, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 349 (1982).
As relevant here, the first-mover effect suggests that so long as U.S. software companies are
considered to be reliable sources of sufficiently strong cryptographic software, it will be hard for
foreign companies to break into the market for such software. Who wants to buy software of
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U.S. industry has seized and expanded on the concerns expressed
in the Commerce Department/NSA study. In a separate report,."
also issued in January 1996, a number of CEOs of technology
companies9 concluded that current U.S. export controls threaten to
harm significantly the U.S. computer industry as well as the banking,
telecommunications, pharmaceutical, and other sectors.' The CEOs
highlighted the growing demand for global security solutions that they
claim "sharply" contrast with current U.S. policies restricting the
availability of U.S. solutions in international markets." They argued
'that the Internet (the "Global Information Infrastructure") offers
unprecedented business and individual opportunities, but that it will
need security features.62 "[W]ith or without U.S. government
intervention," they asserted, the need for encryption "will inevitably
be met by better cryptographic products. ""
Recent articles in the trade press confirm this trend. For example,
RSA Data Security, Inc., the dominant U.S. supplier of encryption
software, has announced that it will begin producing full-strength
encryption software in China, which currently has no export con-
trols.' The Apache Group, based in the United Kingdom, advertises
that U.S. companies cannot match the 128-bit encryption capability
in its Unix Internet Server software.65 Similarly, Nippon Telephone
and Telegraph has indicated that it will be exporting triple-DES
chips.66
uncertain strength if a known, adequate product already is available? In fact, the first-mover
effect can be even stronger if the software product becomes a de facto standard. If Microsoft
and Netscape were to agree on a cryptographic standard for the Internet, their standard would
become virtually impossible to compete against. However, if U.S. export controls prevent U.S.
companies from maintaining their first-mover advantage, foreign companies will be able to
compete, or even to seize the first-mover advantage for themselves. At that point, U.S.
companies will be placed at a severe competitive disadvantage or may find themselves locked out
completely.
58. Computer Systems Policy Project, Perspective on Society in the Information Age (visited Nov.
13, 1996) <http://wwv.cspp.org/reports/reportl-96.html> (on file with The American University
Law Review).
59. See Computer Systems Policy Project, Computer Systems Policy Project Home Page (visited
Nov. 13, 1996) <http://www.cspp.org/index.hnl> (on file with The American University Law
Review) (stating that Computer Systems Policy Project is organization made up of CEOs of
Apple, Compaq, Data General, Digital Equipment, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, NCR, Silicon Graphics,
Stratus Computer, Sun Microsystems, Tandem, and Unisys). The goal of the organization is to
"develop and advocate public policy positions on current trade and technology issues." Id.




64. See Don Clark, China, U.S. Firm Challenge U.S. on Encryption-Software Exports, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 1996, at A10.
65. See Barlas, supra note 42, at 102-03.
66. See i.
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C. National Research Council Report
On May 30, 1996, the National Research Council released a report
that has further fueled the push for export liberalization. The
congressionally-mandated report, entitled "Cryptography's Role in
Securing the Information Society,"67 challenged the aggressiveness
of the government's push for key escrow and underscored the need
for strong encryption to ensure confidentiality, provide reliable user
authentication, and detect unauthorized tampering with electronic
data.' The report recommended the ready exportation of products
with up to 56-bit key lengths and called for streamlining export
licensing requirements.69
D. Proposed Legislation
Exporters' calls for easing encryption export controls have found
a voice in Congress. During the 104th Congress, three bills relating
to encryption were considered, each bill having some measure of
bipartisan support.7" All three bills would have eased export controls
on encryption software and hardware.
The Encryption Communications Privacy Act of 1996 ("ECPA") bill
would have liberalized export controls7 on the theory that stringent
limits on exports of encryption technology effectively cap the level of
technology marketed in the United States72 and thus restrict
Americans' access to the best technology possible. The companion
bill to the ECPA, the Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act
67. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYrOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (Kenneth Damn & Herbert Lin eds., 1996). See generally Elizabeth Corcoran, Easing of
Encryption Technology Curbs Backed; Panel Says Restrictions on Exports ofComputerPrograms Are Hurting
American Citizens, WASH. POST, May 31, 1996, at B3.
68. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 67, at 8-26.
69. See id. at 8-16 to 8-17.
70. Two of these bills, the Encryption Communications Privacy Act of 1996 ("ECPA"),
S. 1587, 104th Cong. (1996), and the Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act ("SAFE"),
H.R. 3011, 104th Cong. (1996), were companion bills that were introduced in the Senate and
the House, respectively, in March 1996. The third and most recent bill, the Promotion of
Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era Act ("Pro-CODE"), S. 1726, 104th Cong. (1996), was
introduced in the Senate in early May 1996.
71. SeeS. 1726 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 2805(b)) (delineating controls for
export of information security hardware, software, and technology).
72. Because it can be difficult for companies to produce two separate lines of products for
domestic and foreign use, companies often make products using the lowest common
denominator of technology that can be sold in both markets. According to many high
technology companies, this prevents Americans from having access to, the highest possible
standard of technology.
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("SAFE"), was introduced in the House on March 5, 1996,73 the same
day that its counterpart was introduced in the Senate.74
In early May, the Senate introduced the Promotion of Commerce
On-Line in the Digital Era Act ("Pro-CODE"),' a second version of
the ECPA bill mentioned above.76 Pro-CODE was narrower in scope
than the original ECPA bill, and its sponsors viewed it as a "stream-
lined" measure designed to move through committee more quickly.
77
Although the structure and the scope of the ECPA, SAFE, and Pro-
CODE bills differed, the substantive portions addressing encryption
export controls were similar. All three bills would have shifted
exclusive authority over commercial encryption exports from the State
Department to the Commerce Department. All three proposed the
"generally available" standard to determine whether a license is
required for export. Finally, all three called for the "financial
institutions" standard, although they differed as to whether they would
apply this standard to software, hardware, or both.
Senator Burns (R.-Mont.), a chief sponsor of the ECPA bill and the
Pro-CODE bill, has indicated that he will re-introduce similar legisla-
tion in the 105th Congress. Representative Goodlatte (R.-Va.), a
primary sponsor of the House counterpart, has indicated that he is
not satisfied with the Administration's proposal, and both he and
Senator Burns are likely to push for oversight hearings in 1997.78
IV. RECENT LEGAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. ENCRYPTION
EXPORT CONTROLS
Litigation has brought encryption export controls out of the closet
and into the courtroom. In one recent case, a U.S. engineer named
Philip Kam sought permission from the State Department to export,
in floppy disk form, the text of a book on encryption that provided
the program language for a version of cryptographic software.79 The
State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls determined that
73. See 142 CONG. REC. H1715 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996).
74. See id. at S1516.
75. See id. at 54624 (daily ed. May 2, 1996).
76. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (outlining provisions of ECPA).
77. See 142 CONG. REC. at S4625 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
78. See New Plan, supra note 45, at 1, 23.
79. See Karn v. Department of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (D.D.G. 1996). For additional
information on Karm, see Phil Karn, The Applied COyptography Case (last modified Dec. 12, 1996)
<http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkam/export> (on file with The American University Law
Review) and Electronic Frontier Foundation, Kam Archive (last modified Sept. 25, 1996)
<http://vnvw.eff.org/pub/Privacy/rTAR-export/KamSchneier-_export-case> (on file with The
American University Law Review).
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the diskette was subject to ITAR control, and Karn appealed.80 After
the denial of his appeal, Karn filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia."1 Judge Charles R. Richey issued
summary judgment for the government, holding that the State
Department's export licensing process is not subject to judicial
review.82 The court also held that regulation of encryption software
does not constitute restraint of free speech. 3
In another recent case, 4 the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
on behalf of Daniel Bernstein, a graduate student at the University of
California at Berkeley.8 5 The issue presented in that case concerned
Bernstein's right to publish a new encryption algorithm electronical-
ly.86 In a ruling denying the government's motion to dismiss, the
court held that software, including encryption software, is speech
entitled to certain First Amendment protection. 7
Not all speech, however, is protected in an export control context.
Courts consistently have upheld national security-based restrictions on
exports of information.'a Thus, in encryption export control cases,
80. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 4.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 8 (dismissing Karn's Administrative Procedures Act challenge of State
Department's jurisdiction determination because Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(a)(1), pursuant to which ITAR was promulgated, precludes judicial review).
83. See id. at 12 (granting summary judgment to government on Karn's First Amendment
claim that regulation of encryption software constitutes restraint on free speech).
84. See id. at 14 (granting summary judgment to government on Kam's Fifth Amendment
claim that government regulation of diskette containing encryption program violated his right
to substantive due process).
85. See Bernstein v. Department of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1996). For
more information on Bernstein, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Bernstein Archive (last
modified Dec. 30, 1996) <http://ww.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITARexport/Bemstein_case> (on
file with The American University Law Review). Bernstein requested a commodity jurisdiction
determination from the State Department to ascertain whether encryption software he
developed as a Ph.D. candidate was controlled by ITAR. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1430. The
Office of Defense Trade Controls concluded that the software was indeed a defense article
under Category XIII(b) (1) of the U.S. Munitions List. See id. at 1429-30 (citing 22 C.F.R. § 121.1
cat. XIII(b) (1)).
86. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1430. Bernstein challenged ITAR's prohibition against
teaching his algorithm or publishing it in ajournai or on-line without a license. See id. at 1430-
31.
87. See id. at 1436 ("For the purposes of First Amendment analysis, ... source code is
speech."). In Kern, howeverJudge Richey declined to rule on whether the program language
(or "source code") of encryption software fell within the gamut of First Amendment protection
as speech. See Kern, 925 F. Supp. at 9 n.19.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487, 1496 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that First
Amendment does not bar government restrictions on export of information included in U.S.
Munitions List, even when information at issue already is available publicly); United States v.
Edler Indus., Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that statute and accompanying
regulations controlling export of technical data related to items in U.S. Munitions List were not
overbroad and therefore did not interfere with constitutionally protected speech); Trane Co.
v. Baldridge, 552 F. Supp. 1378, 1388 (W.D. Wisc. 1983) (concluding that provision of Export
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courts must balance First Amendment protections with the
government's regulation of export privileges.89 That is, in determin-
ing the constitutionality of encryption export controls, courts must
ascertain whether there is a sufficiently compelling governmental
interest in regulating encryption exports and whether the regulation
is narrowly tailored to further that interest.90
Finally, in a third case, a Case Western Reserve University law
professor filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio challenging the State Department's controls on exports of
cryptographic computer software.9  He alleged that the controls
violate the First Amendment by limiting his ability to teach foreign
students and to discuss cryptographic material with foreign colleagues.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As noted above, there is a growing commercial imperative for
strong information security." For financial institutions that must
protect transmissions, the authentication and data integrity excep-
tions93 no longer are sufficient, and the banking exception is too
narrow and ill-defined.94 Similarly, telecommunications compa-
nies-including pay-television, cable, cellular and digital telephone
services-need to offer effective security to their customers. Users of
Administration Act and accompanying regulations, prohibiting certain communications by U.S.
persons with boycotted countries or with blacklisted firms or persons, did not violate First
Amendment), af'd, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984); cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51
(1961) ("[G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First
... Amendment forbade Congress ... to pass, when they have been found justified by
subordinating valid governmental interests ...."); United States v. Brumage, 377 F. Supp. 144,
150 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("[A] federal statute regulating foreign commerce closely related to foreign
affairs and national security... is entitled to the highest presumption of validity.").
89. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1433-38 (analyzing whether subjecting encryption software
to licensing requirement raises colorable First Amendment claim).
90. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 9-13. In assessing the constitutionality of the ITAR, the court
in Kan applied the criteria set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), a case in
which the Supreme Court upheld the government's prohibition against burning draft cards. See
id. at 386. Under the O'Brien analysis, a regulation that is content-neutral such as ITAR (that
is, the intent of ITAR is not to control the content of speech or expressive conduct, but rather
to thwart the encryption efforts of foreign intelligence sources) may be justified so long as the
regulation "'furthers an important or substantial governmental interest,' and 'the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.'" Kama, 925 F. Supp. at 11 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
91. For information on Junger, see Electronic Frontier Foundation, Junger Archive (last
modified Oct. 2, 1996) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR-export/
Junger.v..DoS> (on file with The American University Law Review).
92. See supra Part I (discussing information security needs in today's global economy).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36 (describing Access Control and Data
Authentication Exceptions to ITAR).
94. See supra text accompanying note 34 (presenting Banking or Money Transactions
Exception to ITAR).
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communications software are demanding greater information security
as well. Companies with sites around the world must be able to
transmit customer information, design information, and financial
information with absolute confidence. Encryption export controls
should not be so strict as to prevent U.S. software developers and U.S.
hardware manufacturers from offering security products to compete
for such customers.
From the commercial perspective, U.S. companies increasingly rely
on international sales to remain viable. Indeed, the market for
information security is international. If U.S. businesses cannot meet
those demands, domestic companies almost certainly will forfeit their
competitive edge in encryption technology. Meanwhile, strong
cryptographic products often are readily available overseas. For
instance, at least one company has announced a partnership with the
Chinese Government and the Academy of Sciences to implement the
RSA algorithm.95 Against this backdrop, one significant gap in
current encryption export policy is the absence of a "foreign
availability" standard, which would relax U.S. controls on products
that already are available overseas.
At a more fundamental level, the availability of cryptographic
software outside the United States underscores the futility of overly
restrictive unilateral export controls. In today's global marketplace,
geographic boundaries present fewer and fewer barriers to trade.
Thus, now that the business world is linked electronically, U.S.
restrictions arguably will drive the restricted activities outside the
United States without limiting the development or dissemination of
the "controlled" technology.
Although the debate regarding the pace and direction of export
liberalization will continue, there is no doubt that controls will be
relaxed in the days ahead. The commercial and technical strains on
the existing control framework simply are too great, and they are
growing almost daily. Efforts to liberalize controls will seek to balance
commercial and individual privacy against law enforcement needs and
national security concerns. That balancing act suggests that some
form of export restrictions will survive the debate and that future
advances in information technology could lead to even further efforts
by the government to control it.
95. SeeDon Clark, China, US Firm Challenge US on Encryption-Software Exports, WALt. ST.J., Feb.
8, 1996, at A1O.
